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A TAXONOMY OF LAWYER REGULATION:
How Contrasting Theories of Regulation Explain the Divergent Regulatory
Regimes in Australia, England/Wales, and North America
NOEL SEMPLE, 1 RUSSELL G. PEARCE, 2 RENEE NEWMAN KNAKE 3

ABSTRACT
What explains the dramatic contrast between legal services regulation in the United States and
anglophone Canada, on one hand, and England/Wales and Australia, on the other? In order to help
explain these divergent regulatory choices, and to further comparative analysis, this Essay proposes a
taxonomy 4 of theories of legal services regulation drawn from these common-law jurisdictions. Although
most jurisdictions employ a combination of approaches, as well as some hybrid methods, the Essay
identifies the two dominant perspectives: (1) the professionalist-independent framework, predominate in
anglophone North America, and (2) the consumerist-competitive framework found in the common law
jurisdictions of Northern Europe and Australia. This theoretical divide, in turn, helps explain why the
United States and Canada have largely adhered to a body of self-regulation focused upon aspirations of
professionalism and professional independence. Australia and England/Wales, by contrast, have
embarked upon market-oriented reform that purports to promote consumer protection and consumer
interests. In describing this taxonomy, we recognise jurisdictions sometimes employ hybrid regulatory
strategies that combine elements of the professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive
frameworks, such as gatekeeper rules promulgated by the State (as opposed to gatekeeper regulations
promulgated by judges or the legal profession). We also acknowledge that regulatory approaches are
dynamic and that regulators may very well shift perspectives over time. Nevertheless, organising the
claims of commentators and regulators into categories will help to promote analysis and comparison of
legal services regulations, as well as to improve the quality of decision-making by those who craft and
enforce the rules. We identify, for example, the crucial distinction between how these two approaches
construct an understanding of legal services clients. Consumerist-competitive systems identify clients as
consumers (who are similar to consumers of other goods and services) and apply this perspective to the
particular context of purchasing legal services. In contrast, professionalist-independent systems
understand the experience of a legal services client as fundamentally different from that of other
consumers and, accordingly, require a wholly distinct regulatory approach.
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The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I situates our inquiry in the context of a larger, more fundamental
question: why regulate legal services in the first instance? We identify and describe various theories that
explain the introduction of regulation, contrasting in particular the private interest (capture) and public
interest (market failure) approaches. Part II then turns to an exploration of the regulators' normative
theories on how legal services ought to be regulated. Here we describe the taxonomy of consumeristcompetitive and professionalist-independent approaches, including how consumerist-competitive
approaches tend to favour government regulation, market-oriented solutions, firm-level accountability,
and principles-based regulatory strategies and why professionalist-independent approaches tend to favour
self-regulation, individual lawyer accountability, and command-and-control regulatory strategies.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Australia and England/Wales 5 took a markedly different approach to the regulation of
legal services than the United States or Canada. Regulatory efforts in Australia and England/Wales
provided different responses to changing technological and social conditions with a purported goal of
enhancing both market competition and innovative regulatory strategies. By contrast, the American Bar
Association (ABA), in response to the recent work of the ABA 20/20 Commission, embraced only
minimal changes related to technology advancements and generally rejected efforts to promote market
competition and innovation. 6 While a few Canadian provinces made similar limited changes, most
resisted these trends. 7 Instead, anglophone North American jurisdictions generally adhere to a relatively
traditional system of regulation based on professional independence.
Although a number of scholars and commentators throughout the common law world have noted these
divergent regulatory responses, 8 they have devoted less attention to the justifications that underpin these
responses. This Essay proposes a taxonomy of the rationales underlying the contrasting regulatory
strategies in order to help explain their divergence and to promote comparative analysis. In doing so, we
build on the path-breaking work of Richard Abel in offering a taxonomy of sociological theories of the

5

We refer to England/Wales recognising that the Legal Services Act (2007) generally refers to England and Wales,
but not the other jurisdictions within the United Kingdom.
6

See ABA Model Rule 1.1, Comment 8 (2012): ‘To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should
keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant
technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements
to which the lawyer is subject’. (emphasis added to highlight revised language).

7

Significant reform to rules about alternative business structures is being considered in the provinces of Ontario
(Alternative Business Structures Working Group, First Report to Convocation (June 27, 2013), (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 2013) online: LSUC
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147495044> accessed 3 December 2013 and Nova
Scotia (Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, "2013 – 2016 Strategic Framework," online:
http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/cms/menu-pdf/strategicframework.pdf > accessed 3 December 2013. In British
Columbia, the regulator is examining the question of whether notaries, paralegals, and lawyers should be brought
under the authority of a single regulator (Law Society of British Columbia, "Public Consultations in Vancouver,
Victoria and Prince George on Future of Legal Regulation (Press Release, September 5, 2013)," online:
<http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3811&t=Public-consultations-in-Vancouver,-Victoria-and-PrinceGeorge-on-future-of-legal-regulation> accessed 5 November 2013.
8

Among the numerous commentaries and publications, legal services regulation is the topic of a new annual
International Conference of Legal Regulators and a major new monograph (Frank Stephen, Lawyers, Markets and
Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2013)).
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legal profession 9 and David Wilkins in providing a taxonomy of models for controlling lawyer conduct.10
Our taxonomy classifies strategies for regulating legal services, including economic, sociological, policy,
and professional perspectives.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I situates our inquiry in the context of a larger, more fundamental
question: why regulate legal services in the first instance? It contrasts private interest (capture) theories
relating regulation to supplier self-interest with public interest theories about regulation's value for clients
and the public. The private interest theories include both sociological and economic variants, while the
public interest theories divide into market-failure and legal-ethical accounts.
Part II then considers regulators' normative theories of how legal services should be regulated. Here we
propose a distinction between a professionalist-independent framework that valorises the professional
independence of lawyers and focuses on the special, non-consumer interests of clients versus a
consumerist-competitive framework that focuses on the consumer interests of clients and seeks to
advance them by fostering competition between legal service providers. These two frameworks, in turn,
rely on underlying core values and promote particular regime elements, including (i) occupational
structure, (ii) governance, (iii) regulatory posture toward people other than legal services licensees, and
(iv) level of regulatory focus (individual versus firm). In anglophone North America, the professionalistindependent model is the dominant, although not exclusive strategy, while England/Wales and Australia
generally employ the consumerist-competitive approach.
But while a particular approach may be dominant, most jurisdictions do not rely exclusively on one or the
other and may shift their reliance from one regime to another over time. For example, while legal
services regulators in the United States generally apply a professionalist-independent approach, a few
jurisdictions have begun to apply a consumerist-competitive approach to permit licensed paralegals. 11
Similarly, England/Wales generally employs consumerist-competitive strategy but maintains a system of
self-regulating front line regulators based upon a professionalist-independent model. 12 Jurisdictions also
employ hybrid frameworks, such as a professionalist-regulatory model that combines professionalist
assumptions regarding lawyer capabilities with consumerist disregard for self-regulation and includes
gatekeeping legislation and common law malpractice doctrine. 13
We intend our taxonomy of current regulatory approaches to assist scholars and regulators alike as they
evaluate merits of existing regulation and consider proposals for reform. 14 For purposes of this Essay, we

9

Richard Abel, American Lawyers (Oxford University Press, 1989) 14-39. Abel divides sociological theories of the
legal profession into Weberian, Marxist, and structural-functionalist categories.

10

David B. Wilkins, ‘Who Should Regulate Lawyers?’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 799. Wilkins identifies
‘compliance arguments’ and ‘independence arguments’ and argues for a contextual approach to calibrating the use
of compliance and independence approaches.
11

See discussion infra (n 160).

12

See discussion infra (n 161).

13

See discussion infra (n 162).

14

Significant changes can be seen in legal services regulatory regimes across the common law world. For example,
consider the very short period which elapsed between the implementation of the Legal Services Act 2007 in fall
2011 and the call for another major overhaul just two years later in fall 2013. See Owen Bowcott, 'Labyrinthine
legal services regulation 'needs to be streamlined'' (The Guardian, first published 10 September 2013)
www.theguardian.com/law/2013/sep/10/legal-services-board-labyrinthine-regulation (last accessed 23 October
2013). Similarly, shortly after the ABA 20/20 Commission declined to engage in meaningful reform related to
nonlawyer ownership, multidisciplinary partnerships, and limited license legal technicians or similar efforts to
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do not take a normative position on the relative merits of the contrasting approaches. 15 Rather, we seek to
clarify and facilitate analysis of legal services regulation as well as to improve the quality of decisionmaking by those who craft and enforce the rules.

PART I: WHY REGULATE LEGAL SERVICES?
The development of a taxonomy of legal services regulation begins with the question of why we regulate
legal services in the first instance. Part I identifies and briefly summarises the justifications advanced for
regulation of the legal profession across jurisdictions, including economic private interest theory,
sociological private interest theory, market failure public interest theory, and legal-ethical public interest
theory. Interestingly, the competing regulatory regimes in many ways are also rooted in a common goal
of protection for clients (or consumers) but each aims to accomplish this goal via dissimilar means. For
example, as we discuss below, client protection for North American regulators is grounded in
preservation of autonomy for legal services practitioners and the legal profession, often framed as
‘professional independence’, 16 to ensure loyalty and fidelity to the client and to avoid the influence of a
competing interest such as a non-lawyer partner in the law practice. By contrast, client protection for
Australia and England/Wales is drawn from consumer protection principles. Part I concludes by
observing that while some of these theories provide a justification for different regulatory approaches,
others merely offer critique.
1.1 Private Interest Theories
According to the private interest theory of legal services regulation, rules are created in order to protect
the interests of lawyers. This is an application of the capture theory of regulation, which holds that
regulation is typically ‘acquired’ by the regulated group, and ‘designed and operated primarily for its
benefit’. 17 Economists and critical sociologists have developed distinct versions of the private interest
theory, but their shared premise is that provider self-interest typically explains observed regulation. The
private interest critique implicates all regulated occupations (especially self-regulating ‘professions’), but
it has also been specifically and forcefully applied to lawyers.
1.1.1 Economic Private Interest Theory
The economic critique of occupational regulation began where modern economics itself began: in 1776,
with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Smith suggested that the true purpose of mandatory
apprenticeships in that era was the suppression of competition. 18 He also denounced self-regulatory
occupational groups as natural fora for ‘conspiracy against the public’ and ‘contrivance to raise prices’. 19

liberalise who may practice certain segments of law, a number of states have embarked on formal exploratory
endeavors to assess these and related reforms. Regarding changes in Canada, see n 7, supra.
15

For the purposes of this Essay, legal services regulation includes only rules enforceable by the State or by a body
with state-recognised powers.
16

For example, ABA Model Rule 5.4 is titled ‘Professional Independence of a Lawyer’.

17

George J. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science 3.
18
19

Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1776), Book I, Chap. 10, Part II.
Ibid.
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The subsequent economic literature in this field may be understood as an elaboration and empirical
buttressing of Smith’s views. 20 A major contribution came with George Stigler's ‘regulatory capture’
concept in 1971. Stigler argued that economic groups consistently seek to enrich themselves by securing
the state’s coercive power to limit competition and fix prices.21 Very soon after this idea became
ascendant, its applicability to professional self-regulation was recognised. 22 While the members of an
economic group must typically exert some effort to capture a state regulatory agency and bend it to their
interests, a self-regulator controlled by members of the occupational group is effectively 'pre-captured'. 23
Self-regulation gives an occupational group carte blanche to manipulate regulation in order to enrich
itself. 24
To rebut arguments that regulation serves the public interest, 25 economists in this school point to evidence
that regulation of legal services and other occupations is excessive, ineffectual or unnecessary to protect
consumers. 26 They posit that the goal of occupational self-regulators (such as the American attorney
licensing and disciplinary authorities or the Canadian law societies) is, instead, to maximise economic
rents (artificially created transfers) for the members of the group. 27 Rent-seeking can take the form of
‘ethics’ rules which reduce competitive behaviour. For example, prohibitions on multi-disciplinary
practices and nonlawyer ownership or investment in law practices are understood as mechanisms to
suppress competition and reserve profits for members of the legal profession, 28 as are limitations on
advertising and client solicitation.29
20

Benjamin H. Barton, ‘Economists on Deregulation of the American Legal Profession: Praise and Critique’ (2011)
2011 Michigan State Law Review 493.

21

See Stigler (n 17) 4-7.

22

See Stephen (n 8) Chapter 7.

23

Anthony Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97; Javier Núnez, ‘Can
Self Regulation Work?: A Story of Corruption, Impunity and Cover-up’ (2007) 31 Journal of Regulatory Economics
209.
24

See e.g. Iain Paterson, Marcel Fink and Anthony Ogus, Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of Liberal
Professions in Different Member States (Study for the European Commission, DG Competition) (2003) 18-21;
Gillian Hadfield, ‘Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control Over
Corporate Legal Markets,’ (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1689.
25

See section 1.2, below, for an account of the public interest theory of legal services regulation.

26

Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini, ‘Barriers to Entry and the Self-Regulating Profession: Evidence from
the Market for Italian Accountants’ in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini (eds), Organized Interests and
Self -Regulation : An Economic Approach (Oxford University Press 1999) 132-3; Richard Moorhead, Avrom Sherr
and Alan Paterson, ‘Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales’ (2003) 37 Law
& Society Review 765; Morris M. Kleiner and Hwikwon Ham, Regulating Occupations: Does Occupational
Licensing Increase Earnings and Reduce Employment Growth? (2005) 2-3.
27

Mario Pagliero, ‘What is the Objective of Professional Licensing? Evidence from the US Market for Lawyers’
(2011) 29 International Journal of Industrial Organization 473; Robert D. Tollison, ‘Rent Seeking: A Survey’
(1982) 35 Kyklos International Review for Social Sciences 575, 578.
28

Deborah Rhode, ‘Reforming American Legal Practice and Legal Education: Rethinking the Role of Nonlawyers
in Delivering and Financing Legal Services,’ (2014) Legal Ethics [forthcoming].
29

Geoffrey Hazard, Russell Pearce and Jeffrey Stempel, ‘Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market
Analysis of Legal Services,’ (1983) 58 New York University Law Review 1084.
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Rents are most reliably guaranteed by cartels, which is how these critics perceive licensing regimes. 30
Occupational licensing, backed by the criminal prosecution of unauthorised practice, is understood as ‘use
of the political process to improve the economic circumstances of a group’. 31 If the licensing hurdles are
set by self-regulatory groups, they will make them excessively onerous.32 As Milton Friedman pointed
out in his analysis of the medical profession, lobbying for new licensing regimes and barriers almost
invariably comes from occupational groups, and not from consumers. This, according to Friedman, is a
telling indication that licenses serve the interests of the former group at the expense of the latter. 33 Far
from safeguarding the public, Friedman argued,
licensure has reduced both the quantity and quality of medical practice…
reduced the opportunities available to people who would like to be physicians,
forcing them to pursue occupations they regard as less attractive; [and] forced
the public to pay more for less satisfactory medical service. 34
Alex Maurizi found empirical support for the proposition that self-regulatory professions manipulate the
pass rates on licensing exams to preserve professional incomes as demand fluctuates; 35 Mario Pagliero
added similar evidence specific to American lawyers. 36 When standards are raised, existing practitioners
are often ‘grandfathered’ while new entrants must meet the higher standard.37 According to the capture
critique, grandfathering is a safe way for the members of the occupation to restrict supply and enhance
their collective reputation without putting themselves to the inconvenience of meeting the higher
standards. 38
1.1.2 Sociological Private Interest Theory
The critical sociology of the professions has also analysed their development and interaction using the
premise of self-interest. This sociological version of the private interest theory (also known as the ‘market
control’ approach) is often traced to early-20th century German sociologist Max Weber.39 Weber
30

Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, Rent-Seeking And Innovation (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Research Department Staff Report 347) (2004); Deborah L. Rhode, ‘Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions’ (1981) 34 Stanford Law Review 1
(noting that the legal profession’s “conduct in restricting entry and negotiating agreements with competing groups is
that of a trade association or cartel, rather than that of a monopolist.”).
31

See Stigler (n 17) 13.

32

Avner Shaked and John Sutton, ‘The Self-Regulating Profession’ (1981) 47 Review of Economic Studies 217, 225.
See also Hayne E. Leland, ‘Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards’ (1979) 87
Journal of Political Economy 1328, 1337-9.
33

Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press [1962] 2002) 140.

34

Ibid, 158.

35

Alex Maurizi, ‘Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest’ (1974) 82 Journal of Political Economy 399.

36

See Pagliero (n 27).

37

James E. Moliterno, The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and Responses to Change (Oxford
2013) 100 and 106-7.
38

Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation : Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press 1994) 220; Manitoba Law
Reform Commission, Regulating Professions and Occupations (Manitoba Law Commission 1994).
39

See e.g., Abel (n 9).
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observed the recurring tendency of economic competitors to form interest groups among themselves.
These eventually evolve into a ‘legal order that limits competition through formal monopolies’. 40 After a
period of quiescence this approach was enthusiastically revived around 1970, and flourished for the next
25 years. The assumption of professional self-interest and the focus on social power are leitmotifs running
through the leading texts of the sociological version of capture.41
One of the distinct contributions of the sociological tradition, which is not present in the economists'
version, is the dual nature of professional self-interest. It has a pecuniary aspect (professionals' desire for
market-control or market-shelter to enrich themselves), 42 but it also manifests itself in their desire to set
themselves above and apart from other workers and service providers. 43 Self-regulation helps them
accomplish the latter goal by excluding arriviste competitors, and using discipline to expel those who
lower the tone of the ‘club’ after somehow sneaking in. 44 Professional discipline regimes are a favourite
target for critics in this tradition. Typically it is argued that professional discipline will either be lax, or
else will protect the interest of the profession and its elites rather than those of the public.45
Lawyers are often identified (along with doctors) as archetypal professionals.46 It is therefore
unsurprising that both the economic and the sociological versions of the capture critique have been
applied explicitly to lawyers. Richard Abel and Deborah Rhode are perhaps the common law world's best
known and most prolific authors in this tradition. Regulation, according to Abel, has typically been used
by Anglo-American lawyers to dampen competition,47 build legitimating myths 48 and avert surveillance
40

Max Weber, Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus
Wittich; translators: Ephraim Fischoff et al. (Bedminster Press [1922] 1968) 342 -344.
41

Terence Johnson, Professions and Power (Macmillan 1972); Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism :
A Sociological Analysis (University of California Press 1977); Andrew Delano Abbott, The System of Professions :
An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (University of Chicago Press 1988); Anne Witz, Professions and
Patriarchy (Routledge 1992).
42

Stefan Timmermans, ‘Professions and Their Work: Do Market Shelters Protect Professional Interests?’ (2008) 35
Work and Occupations 164, 165.
43
Eliot Freidson, Professionalism : The Third Logic (Polity Press 2001) 199; see also Larson (n 41): ‘I see
professionalization as the process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a market
for their expertise. Because marketable expertise is a crucial element in the structure of modern inequality,
professionalization appears also as a collective assertion of special social status and as a collective process of
upward social mobility’. Regarding the definition of ‘service providers’ and regulatory treatment of lawyers as
service providers, see Laurel S. Terry, ‘The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the
Legal Profession as “Service Providers,”’ (2008) 2008 ABA Journal of the Professional Lawyer 189.
44

Robert P. Kaye, ‘Regulated (Self-)Regulation: A New Paradigm for Controlling the Professions?’ (2006) 21
Public Policy and Administration 105.
45

E.g., regarding lawyers, see Harry Arthurs, ‘The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital
Signs?’ (1995) 33 Alberta Law Review 800, 805; Duncan Webb, ‘Are Lawyers Regulatable?’ (2008) 5 Alberta Law
Review 233, 247; Alice Woolley, ‘Regulation in Practice’ (2012) 15 Legal Ethics 243; Deborah L. Rhode,
‘Professional Regulation and Public Service: An Unfinished Agenda’ in Scott L. Cummings (ed), The Paradox of
Professionalism : Lawyers and the Possibility of Justice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 161.
46

E.g. Gunter Burkart, ‘Professions and Professionalization’ in Austin Harrington, Barbara L. Marshall and HansPeter Müller (eds), Encyclopedia of Social Theory (Routledge 2006).
47

Richard Abel, ‘England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and Solicitors’ in
Richard L. Abel and Philip Lewis (eds), Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (University of California
Press 1988) 43-4; See Abel (n 30) 142.
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by outsiders. 49 Rhode has argued that lawyers' fear of third-party lawsuits has impeded the adoption of
broader ethical standards, 50 and pointed to various regulatory policy issues in which the Bar's interest is
so directly affected that self-regulators should never be expected to make disinterested decisions.51
Benjamin Barton and Gillian Hadfield are other influential scholars who have applied capture theory to
American legal services regulation. Barton contends that judges, as lawyers, consistently favour lawyers'
interests in regulating them, 52 while Hadfield argues that the American legal profession’s monopoly
distorts access to justice. 53
The private interest theory has been applied to legal services regulatory regimes around the common law
world. 54 Julian Webb has analysed the ramifications of evolving economic and governance phenomena
for the legal profession using this standpoint.55 Frank Stephen's empirical research offers evidence for
self-interest and capture among UK legal services regulators prior to the Legal Services Act, 2007. 56
Constance Backhouse has shown how Canadian lawyers used professionalism rhetoric and legal ethics
rules to ‘exercise power and exclusion based on gender, race, class and religion.’ 57 Other legal scholars
48

Richard L. Abel, ‘Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?’ (1981) 59 Texas Law Review 639, 667 et seq.

49

Abel, ‘England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and Solicitors’in Lawyers in
society: The Common Law World (n 47) 24. See also Richard L. Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State:
The Politics of Professionalism (Oxford University Press 2003); Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Dock: Learning
from Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings (Oxford University Press 2008).
50

Deborah L. Rhode, ‘Moral Counseling’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1317, 1333; Deborah L. Rhode,
‘Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions’ (1981) 34 Stanford Law Review 1, 6.
51

Deborah L. Rhode, ‘Professionalism In Perspective: Alternative Approaches To Nonlawyer Practice’ (1996) 22
New York University Review of Law & Social Change 701, 706; Deborah L. Rhode, Access to justice (Oxford
University Press 2004); ibid Deborah L. Rhode and Alice Woolley, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada’ (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2761. In a
similar vein, see Sung Hui Kim, ‘Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping’ (2011) 63
Florida Law Review 129, 144.
52

Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American legal system (Cambridge University Press
2011)[Barton, Lawyer-Judge Bias] 23, 132. See also Benjamin Hoorn Barton, ‘Why Do We Regulate Lawyers: An
Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation’ (2001) 33 Arizona State Law Journal
429.
53

Gillian Hadfield, ‘The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System,’ (2000) 98
Michigan Law Review 953.
54

Its influence can be seen in works such as Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice
(Oxford University Press 1999) and Avrom Sherr, ‘The ‘Control’ Orthodoxy in England and Wales – A
Retrospective Review’ (2009) 16 International Journal of the Legal Profession 153.
55

Julian Webb, ‘The Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of English Legal Practice - and Some
Lessons for New Zealand’ (2008) 16 Waikato Law Review 21; Julian Webb, ‘Regulating Lawyers in a Liberalized
Legal Services Market: The Role of Education and Training’ (2013) 24 Stanford Law & Policy Review 533.

56

Frank H. Stephen, Report of Further Research on the Law Society of Scotland Guarantee Fund. (Manchester and
Edinburgh: Economy and Global Governance Institute for Law & Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, 2011).
See Chapter 4 of Stephen, Lawyers, Markets and Regulation (n 8) entitled ‘Lawyers and Incentives’.
57

Constance Backhouse, ‘Gender and Race in the Construction of “Legal Professionalism”: Historical Perspectives
(Paper presented at the First Colloquium on the Legal Profession)’.
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who have drawn on private interest and market control analysis include Wesley Pue and James
Moliterno. 58
1.2 Public Interest Theories
The two public interest theories of legal services regulation—market failure and legal-ethical—begin with
the premise that the purpose of regulation is to protect clients, third parties and interests other than those
of legal services providers. Throughout the industrialised world, regulators rely on these related, but
conceptually distinct, rationales to justify their work.
The market failure version perceives legal services as instances of information asymmetries and
externality problems, which occur in various markets. The legal-ethical version is found in lawyer credos
and legal scholarship, as well as in the work of structural-functionalist sociologists. The legal-ethical
approach, in turn, relies on arguments that self-regulation is necessary to protect clients and society. A
major distinction between the legal-ethical and market failure approaches is that the legal-ethical version
treats purchasers of legal services as clients of legal services providers, while the market failure version
treats them as consumers, with the consumers' typical interests in price, quality, and choice.
1.2.1 Market Failure Public Interest Theory
Market failure has been defined as ‘a situation where the free play of market forces cannot be relied upon
to maximise economic welfare’. 59 It is an exception to the doctrines of free markets and caveat emptor,
which are today the general policy premises of wealthy common law countries. 60 The market failure
version of the public interest theory holds that regulation is imposed upon legal services to correct or
mitigate these failures.
Information asymmetry is a commonly cited market failure justifying regulation. 61 The information
problem is that consumers are often unable to ‘judge the value of the services offered on the market in
terms of their own needs and priorities.’ 62 The asymmetry lies in the fact that the provider of expert
services often has a much better grasp of the relevant information than does the prospective consumer. 63
58

W. Wesley Pue and University of Manitoba. Canadian Legal History Project., Lawyers and the Constitution of
Political Society : Containing Radicalism and Maintaining Order in Prairie Canada, 1900-1930 (Faculty of Law,
University of Manitoba 1993) W. Wesley Pue, ‘Becoming “Ethical”: Lawyers’ Professional Ethics in Early
Twentieth Century Canada’ (1991) 20 Manitoba Law Journal 237; Moliterno (n 37) Chapter 2.
59

Frank H. Stephen, ‘Regulation of the Legal Professions or Regulation of Markets for Legal Services: Potential
Implications of the Legal Services Act 2007’ (2008) 19 European Business Law Review 1130, 1131.
60

Michael J. Trebilcock, Carolyn J. Tuohy and Alan D. Wolfson, Professional Regulation : A Staff Study of
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61
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Information asymmetry is a consequence of the experience and credence qualities of expert services. 64
Not only do consumers have difficulty ascertaining their needs for legal services and the quality of the
available alternatives before purchasing them (the experience quality), 65 but they also have difficulty in
evaluating them before and after the purchase (the credence quality).66 The asymmetry is compounded by
the fact that most individual consumer-clients utilise expert services infrequently, and therefore have little
opportunity to learn from experience.67 The failures afflicting markets for professional services were
clearly identified by Kenneth Arrow's 1963 article about medical care, and subsequent scholarship has
argued that they are equally applicable in the case of legal services.68
Specific problems resulting from information asymmetry include supplier-induced demand, 69 and a
downward spiral of declining quality attributable to adverse selection. 70 Legal services regulation can
prevent or mitigate all of these problems. This approach asserts that effective licensure will ensure all
providers meet a minimum quality standard. Meanwhile conduct rules forbid exploitation of vulnerable
clients or inflation of demand.
The second branch of the market failure public interest theory is that regulation prevents negative
externalities resulting from bad legal service provision.71 An externality (also known as a third party
effect) occurs when the costs and benefits of a transaction are not borne exclusively by the parties thereto.
Externalities create the potential for under-production, over-production, and self-dealing by consumers
and producers at the expense of third parties. 72
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A negative externality occurs when a deficiency in the service causes harm to a third party. The third
party might be a secondary victim of the deficiency, along with the innocent consumer. 73 However, a
consumer who suffers from no information asymmetry, and requires no regulatory protection from her
own service provider, might choose to purchase services that cause grave harms to others. Preventing
these outcomes through licensing and conduct rules is the second public interest rationale given for legal
services regulation. 74
In legal services, while protecting consumer-clients is the dominant regulatory rationale, negative
externalities are also mentioned as a reason to regulate. The classic example is the slapdash will. An
inexpensive but poorly prepared will that is ambiguous or incoherent might be perfectly acceptable to a
fully informed client. The testator might visit a drafting solicitor’s office only because she wishes to see
that a certain bequest is made. She might care little about the residue of the estate, given that she will not
be around to see what happens to it. However, the resulting slapdash will can subject the beneficiaries to
many painful and expensive years of personal strife and litigation.75
The third branch of the market failure public interest theory maintains that regulation encourages positive
externalities from legal services provision.76 Just like bad legal services, good legal services can spread
their effects beyond the consumer. Regulation is justified, on this view, because unconstrained market
actors will only transact for the quantity and quality of services that maximises their own welfare. 77 The
unregulated free market would therefore ‘under-produce’ good legal services. Regulation might in
principle be used to encourage purchase of legal services when these positive externalities justify it but
the consumer would not otherwise do so. 78
What are the positive externalities of good legal services? High quality litigated solutions to
controversies create precedents and legal certainty from which others benefit. 79 Hiring a good legal
service provider as opposed to conducting litigation as an unrepresented litigant also has positive
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externalities. 80 Regulation can also encourage—or even mandate—pro bono service that benefits the
public by increasing access to justice at the same time that it benefits indigent individuals.81
1.2.2 Legal-Ethical Public Interest Theory
Bar leaders, 82 legal scholars, 83 and structural-functionalist sociologists 84 have offered a very different
public interest rationale for legal services regulation. Rather than view legal services through the lens of
the market, these commentators argue that the function of legal services providers is exceptional. Based
on the unique characteristics, they assert that licensed legal services providers – lawyers – should as a
general matter regulate legal services independent of interference from the market or the State. They
claim that the legal profession’s independence is necessary for lawyers to protect clients, the rule of law,
and the public good. They differ slightly in their method of argument. Some derive lawyers’ function
from their status while others derive their status from their function.
The argument from status to function begins with the business-profession dichotomy described by bar
leaders, legal scholars, and structural-functionalist sociologists. Unlike business people, lawyers have
both inaccessible expertise and commitment to the public good, which both requires, and justifies societal
reliance upon, the legal profession to regulate itself. 85
As a result, society enters into a bargain with the profession where society agrees to self-regulation that
offers autonomy from regulation by the market and the state. In the words of one commentator,
Perceiving a social need, and the profession's competence to handle it, the society negotiates a
deal with the profession: the society will confer the benefits and privileges of a legal monopoly
upon the group in return for a promise of public service, i.e., a promise to carry on professional
practice in accordance with high standards of performance, for the public good.86
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Complementing the argument from status to function is the argument from function to status that focuses
on the role of lawyers in a liberal democracy. The independence of lawyers is necessary to protect
individual rights, rule of law, and the public good. Independence both prevents ‘any source of authority,
public or private, [from limiting] clients’ access to the public goods encoded in the law’ 87 and encourages
compliance with law by preserving lawyers’ discretion to serve ‘as a mediating force between the
interests of private clients and the public purposes of the legal order.’ 88 According to some, the
independence of lawyers is also essential to protect judicial independence.89
The legal-ethical public interest theories are both similar to, and different from, the market failure public
interest theory. Both approaches acknowledge information asymmetry, as well as negative and positive
externalities. They differ in that the legal-ethical approaches view the delivery of legal services as
essentialist. Many legal ethicists ascribe special interests to lawyers' clients, including a client’s interest
in loyal and devoted service from a trusted professional. These interests are unique, legitimate and not
shared by most other consumers. Charles Fried’s conception of the lawyer as a ‘special-purpose friend’
who, within the scope of his retainer, ‘adopts your interests as his own’ reflects this view. 90 No one would
dream of demanding this from a microwave oven or a futures contract, and reducing client interest to any
permutation of price, quality or choice does not sufficiently contemplate the nuanced and significant
nature of legal advice.
Similarly essentialist is the description of lawyers’ public role. The ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct suggests in the preamble that regulation guides lawyers to contribute to public welfare as
‘officer[s] of the legal system’ who ‘play a vital role in the preservation of society.’ 91 This notion has a
long history in the United States, including Tocqueville’s often quoted description of lawyers as the
aristocracy of the United States, 92 Louis Brandeis’s exhortation that the legal profession promote the
public good, 93 and Roscoe Pound’s description of law practice as the ‘[p]ursuit of the learned art in the
spirit of a public service.’ 94 Structural-functionalist sociologists, such as Emile Durkheim and Talcott
Parsons, offer a corresponding understanding that lawyers serve a necessary and beneficial role as
intermediaries between the people and the law.95 Another version of this understanding is Brad Wendell
and Alice Woolley’s view that the lawyer’s public role involves counselling, dispute resolution and
87
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preventing miscarriages of justice. If it is abandoned or performed negligently, the ‘pluralist compromise
of democracy’ itself is put at risk. 96
As a result of this essentialist view, legal-ethical theories propose that lawyers have the exclusive capacity
to understand lawyers’ duties to their clients, the court, third parties, and the public and to promulgate
regulations to promote and police those duties. Lawyers do so through a scheme of self-regulation that
governs the licensing and discipline of legal services providers, as well as through regulations that focus
on protecting clients such as through rules regarding confidentiality and conflicts; protecting the
administration of justice such as through rules prohibiting client perjury; and promoting the public good
such as through rules encouraging pro bono and compliance with law.97
Within legal-ethical theories, the concept of self-regulation is a relatively broad one. Proponents of legalethical public interest theory do not necessarily require that organisations of lawyers regulate lawyers.
Rather, many commentators describe regulation by judges who are lawyers as self-regulation, presumably
because those judges work closely with the organised bar to develop rules governing lawyers and
ultimately those judges adopt and enforce the rules. 98 As the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct explain:
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted
powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close
relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This
connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested
largely in the courts. 99
Where Part I offers a review of models for explaining the basis for regulating the delivery of legal
services, Part II suggests a taxonomy of modes of regulatory strategies.

PART II: HOW SHOULD LEGAL SERVICES BE REGULATED?
Although sociological private interest theory provides only a critique, economic private interest,
economic public interest, and legal-ethical public interest accounts prescribe regulatory modes. Because
no jurisdiction has applied economic private interest theory to legal services, we focus here upon the
economic and legal-ethical public interest accounts. To describe economic public interest modes of
regulation, we use the term consumerist-competitive to underscore its emphasis on protecting consumers
and promoting competition. To describe legal-ethical public interest modes of regulation, we use the term
professionalist-independent to emphasise its commitment to the essentialist approach to legal services
associated with professionalism and self-regulation. Professionalist-independent regimes are predominant
in common law North America, while consumerist-competitive modes have increasingly come to the fore
in England/Wales and Australia, as well as Ireland and New Zealand.
For purposes of our taxonomy, the dominant approaches of economic and legal-ethical public interest
theories both define principles and suggest regulatory regimes. But examination of how regulation of
96
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legal services functions in practice leads to further refinement of our taxonomy. While particular modes
may be dominant in specific jurisdictions, all common law jurisdictions employ both professionalistindependent and consumerist-competitive strategies, as well as hybrid modes that combine elements of
both. In addition, the professionalist-independent mode has produced an unintended consequence – the
development of a robust sphere of legal services that is largely unregulated.
2.1. The Professionalist-independent Mode of Common Law North America
In the United States and in common law Canada, the dominant approach to legal services regulation still
hews closely to a blueprint drafted in the late nineteenth century. With a few exceptions, these
jurisdictions all maintain a unified, hegemonic occupation of ‘lawyer’ and uphold so-called ‘selfregulatory’ governance, whereby lawyers and lawyer-judges draft, adopt, and enforce the profession’s
rules for admission to practice law and to maintain one’s law license. They are also distinctive in their
regulatory efforts to insulate lawyers from non-lawyer influence through strictures on alternative business
structures, external investment, and multi-disciplinary practice. They similarly promote lawyer
independence from clients as a way to promote the pubic good. Finally, professionalist-independent
regimes focus regulation on individual lawyers, as opposed to the firms in which they work.
2.1.1 Professionalism and Autonomy as Core Values
Professionalism and independence are the two conceptually connected but rhetorically distinct ‘core
values’ which animate legal services regulation in common law North America. 100 As noted in Part I, the
professionalism approach to legal-ethical public interest theory assumes the essentialist character of
lawyers and the lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers differ from providers of other services in that they
both have an understanding of how to protect clients and the public that is inaccessible to non-lawyers
and a unique capacity as individuals and a self-regulating collective to provide those services with fidelity
to clients, courts, and the public good. 101
The second core value is independence, both of lawyers and of the legal profession. Although derived
from the conditions that professionalism describes, the goal of independence is often deployed separately.
It too references the assumption of legal-ethical theory that independence is necessary for lawyers to
represent clients zealously, as well as to promote rule of law and liberal democracy. Both individual
lawyers and lawyers as a group require independence to achieve these goals. 102
Noel Semple, for example, argues that each of the four distinctive characteristics of anglo-North
American legal services regulatory regimes—the unified legal occupation, self-regulation, insulation of
legal services providers, and the focus on individual providers—can be traced to one or both of the
professionalism and independence values. 103 Despite arguments that its influence is waning, 104 the
resilience of the professionalist-independent mode was demonstrated by the rejection of market-oriented
reforms by ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20. 105
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2.1.2 Primacy of Self-Regulation
Self-regulation, the first defining feature of professionalist-independent regimes, is a form of governance
characterised by the right of the regulatees to promulgate and enforce their own regulations.
The self-regulatory character of legal services regulation is clear in common law Canada. Legal services
regulation is dominated by law societies. The law societies are led by boards of directors, the members of
which are known as ‘benchers’. 106 In each law society, at least eighty per cent of the benchers are
licensees. 107
In the United States, while legislatures do engage in some limited forms of legal services regulation, the
dominant roles are played by the state courts as well as state bar and licensing authorities and the ABA.
For purposes of professionalist-independent proponents, the state bar and licensing authorities and the
ABA are considered self-regulatory insofar as they are led by and accountable to lawyers (or lawyerjudges). 108 The judiciary, which has a central role in American legal services regulation,109 is of course a
branch of government. Some commentators therefore argue that the regime is better understood as one
of state regulation or co-regulation rather than self-regulation. 110
For purposes of our taxonomy, we need not resolve this dispute. Rather, we seek to describe the
professionalist-independent principles and practices as described by their proponents. In the United
States today, advocates of a professionalist-independent approach do tend to define regulation by judges
who are lawyers as self-regulation.
2.1.3 The Subject Matter of Professionalist-Independent Regulation
Both professionalism and independence require lawyers to promulgate rules for licensing, conduct, and
discipline. These rules, in turn, prescribe lawyers’ duties to clients, third-parties, courts, and the public. 111
Client protections include guarantees of competence, loyalty, and confidentiality. 112 Essential to these
protections are rules that assure lawyer independence from third parties, including rules that police third
party payments for legal services, prohibit non-lawyer ownership of law firms, and circumscribe conflicts
106
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of interest. 113 Fulfilling obligations to third-parties, courts, and the public also require independence
from clients. Rules generally require lawyers to avoid misleading third parties or assisting clients in
violating the law. 114 They promulgate a duty to the court that includes prohibitions on making frivolous
arguments or facilitating client perjury115 and advance a public good function through the exercise of
independent judgment in counselling clients and an aspiration to provide pro bono assistance to the
poor. 116 We contrast the substantive rules of professionalist-independent regimes with those of
consumerist-competitive regimes below at 2.2.3.
2.1.4 Exclusive Legal Occupation
An axiom of professionalist-independent regulation is that only licensed legal services providers can
provide legal services. Today, within each common law North American jurisdiction there is one group
of people who are authorised to provide legal services independently and that group is known as ‘lawyers.’
Historically, professionalist-independent principles have not necessarily required a unified legal
occupation. In England/Wales, for example, professionalist-independent regulation included licenses for
barristers, solicitors, and notaries. In all professionalist-independent regimes, the delivery of legal
services by those who do not obtain licenses from a self-regulated legal profession is forbidden as
‘unauthorized practice of law’. 117
2.1.5 Insulation of Legal Service Providers
As explained above, professionalist-independent modes protect the independence of lawyers. One
method for doing so is to insulate legal service providers from the influence of non-licensees. Various
business structure rules are deployed to prevent individual providers from being economically beholden
to anyone other than their clients or other lawyers in their firms. While this does not foreclose all possible
forms of collaboration between lawyers and non-lawyers, it does significantly restrict them. 118
Non-lawyers are generally forbidden to own shares or assume directorship in incorporated law practices
in anglo-North American jurisdictions. 119 Regulators also seek to insulate lawyers using rules prohibiting
multi-disciplinary partnerships (MDPs). An MDP is a ‘business arrangemen[t] in which individuals with
different professional qualifications practise together’. 120 North American jurisdictions either forbid such
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arrangements, or regulate them very tightly. 121 Finally, professionalist-independent regulators have also
created rules to prohibit contractual relationships between lawyers and others which would give any
‘nonlawyer…the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer’. 122 As a consequence of
these rules, North American law firms historically have been exclusively financed and controlled by
lawyers, and the consumer legal market has been served almost exclusively by small firms and solo
practitioners.
2.1.6 Regulatory Focus on Individual Lawyers
The professionalist-independent perspective favors, but does not require, regulation of individual lawyers,
and not of law firms. Its essentialist construction of lawyers and legal services assumes that most lawyers
are trustworthy and promotes independence of lawyers, as well as of the legal profession. 123 It assumes
that most lawyers will follow the rules provided them. The primary focus of discipline is the few lawyers
who are not trustworthy. Accordingly, with minor exceptions, American and Canadian legal services
regulation applies to individual lawyers, and not to law firms. American legal scholar Ted Schneyer
recently concluded that, despite the scholarly efforts which Schneyer himself initiated,124 ‘the idea of
disciplining firms has not caught on’ in the United States. 125 This conclusion has been echoed by other
observers of American legal services regulation.126 Adam Dodek’s comprehensive survey of Canadian
legal services regulation reached a similar finding: ‘as a general matter, law societies regulate individual
lawyers,’ and ‘there is little explicit regulatory focus on law firms’ in Canada although at least two
provinces permit it, including British Columbia and Nova Scotia. 127
2.2 The Consumerist-competitive Mode
Beginning in the 1970s, 128 legal services regulators in England/Wales and Australia began to focus on
two core values derived from economic public interest theory: competition and consumer rights. These
values have gradually displaced professionalism and lawyer independence as they are understood in the
United States and Canada, manifesting themselves in regulatory regimes which today contrast sharply
with those of anglophone North America. More recently, the influence of the consumerist-competitive
mode has become evident in legal services regulatory reforms taking place in Ireland and New Zealand.
In Ireland, consumerist-competitive reform has been driven by both the national competition authority
121
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and the similar inclinations of the "Troika" (International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank,
and the European Commission). 129
The consumerist-competitive mode is characterised by (i) multiple and competing legal occupations, (ii)
co-regulatory or external regulatory governance, (iii) tolerance of non-licensees influencing legal services
providers and (iv) a dual regulatory focus on individual service providers and the enterprises in which
they work.
2.2.1 Competition and Consumer Rights as Core Values
Consumerist-competitive approaches reject the essentialist view of legal services, including the businessprofession dichotomy. They treat clients as being similarly situated to other consumers of goods and
services, and lawyers as similar to other producers. Accordingly, applying an economic public interest
theory of regulation, they address market failure by promoting competition and protecting consumers.
Competition between legal services providers is the first core value of these regimes. Many of the statutes
in these jurisdictions now list ‘promoting competition’ among their regulatory objectives.130 Competition
authorities outside of North America have taken a forceful approach to legal services regulation,
providing a major driver of reform. 131 Under economic public interest theory, competition will promote
better quality services at lower prices.
Like competition, the second core value of consumerism treats clients as consumers, as opposed to
essentialist clients. The goal of regulations and of increased competition is to provide consumers with
lower cost services of better quality, while regulating providers to address market failures, such as
information asymmetry. 132 The predominant goal of consumerism is to make legal services cheaper,
more satisfactory to consumers and more variegated. Accordingly, while sharing the professionalistindependent goal of loyal and devoted service, they reject the essentialist claim that lawyer-client
relationship is somehow unique. 133
The goal of promoting competition and consumer interests also addresses externalities. Improving the
quality of legal services reduces the harms to third parties from low quality services. 134 Reducing the
price of legal services provides the positive externality of greater access to justice for low and middle
income persons. 135
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Because consumerist-competitive regimes include active regulation to protect competition and consumers,
consumerist-competitive reforms often result in ambitious and complicated regulation of legal service
providers at the same time they employ the competition-oriented rhetoric of deregulation.136
2.2.2 Co-Regulation or External Regulation
The consumerist-competitive mode rejects the professionalist-independent arguments for independence.
Viewed in the context of consumers and producers more generally, self-regulation appears vulnerable to
self-dealing and other forms of rent seeking. 137 Accordingly, the preferred methods of regulation are
external to legal services providers or co-regulation that includes both lay people and legal services
providers. The most common approach today is co-regulation agencies that include legal services
providers but which are dominated by laypeople and accountable to the legislative or executive branches
of government. 138 In England and Wales, for example, the primary regulator is the Legal Services Board,
which follows this co-regulatory model at the same that it continues to employ subservient self-regulatory
bodies to carry out delegated functions.139
2.2.3 The Subject Matter of Consumerist-Competitive Regulation
The goals of regulating the legal services consumer-provider relationship are similar to those for the
lawyer-client relationship – competence, confidentiality, and loyalty. They similarly forbid lawyers from
assisting clients in crimes or fraud, otherwise misleading third parties or deceiving the courts. Where they
differ is the with regard to goal of lawyer independence. This distinction has three major effects. First, it
could lead to a different evaluation of categories of regulation that both modes share. For example, in a
competitive-consumerist regime, the purpose of conflict rules would be to require competent services and
fulfilment of fiduciary obligations. In a professionalist-independent regime, the prohibition of conflicts
that did not interfere with the provision of services could be justified in order to promote independence.
Second, and similarly, although both regimes reflect public interest theories of regulation, the
consumerist-competitive approach would have more tools available to solve externality problems. The
professionalist-independent approach, for example, turns to a lawyer’s duty of pro bono to redress
inequality in access to justice. The consumerist-competitive approach could certainly require – or
facilitate -- pro bono, but it could also seek through competition and regulation to address the problem
through lower cost, reasonable quality services. Similarly, where professionalist-independent regulators
seek to promote lawyer independent judgment as a vehicle for promoting adherence to law, consumeristcompetitive regulators could take a similar approach and in addition or as an alternative seek to develop
an ethical culture in a particular situation or organisation. We discuss how this insight applies to lawyer
regulation at 2.2.6 below. Third, a consumerist-competitive paradigm is likely to reject rules grounded
solely in the value of independence, such as restrictions on alternative business structures or
multidisciplinary practices discussed at 2.2.5. below. Of course, consumerist-competitive regulators
could theoretically adopt such restrictions, but they would have to justify them on grounds of competence
and integrity, and not independence.
136
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2.2.4 Multiple, Competing Legal Occupations
The value of competition favours a plurality of competing legal services providers. Consumeristcompetitive jurisdictions tend to have multiple licensing regimes, authorising different occupational
groups to compete in different parts of the legal services marketplace.140 In England and Wales,
regulation establishes eight legal occupations.141 Consumerist-competitive ideology also favours
permitting non-licensed legal providers that are subject to consumer protection regulations. These include
the staff of Citizens Advice Bureaus in England/Wales and nonlawyer employees of for-profit businesses,
such as banks, who could conceivably provide assistance to consumers in legal matters, as well as
businesses that provide legal advice through software programs. 142
2.2.5 Tolerance of Non-Licensee Influence within Firms
Compared to professionalist-independent regimes, consumerist-competitive administrations allow
significantly greater scope for non-licensees to become business partners, shareholders and managers of
law firms. In England and Wales, non-lawyers may own and manage incorporated law firms and form
partnerships of equals with lawyers. The Legal Services Act 2007 uses the term ‘alternative business
structure’ for any law firm in which non-lawyers are owners or managers. 143 Australia’s business
structure rules are at least as liberal as England/Wales. Seven of the country’s eight states and the
territories allow non-lawyers to own shares in, and manage, incorporated law firms. 144 Multi-disciplinary
partnerships have been permitted since 1990 and Australia is also home to the first publicly-traded law
firm in the common law world. 145 External investment and collaboration with non-lawyers has facilitated
the emergence of consumer brands and large firms in the personal legal services marketplace, such as the
U.K.’s Co-Operative Legal Services and Australia's Slater & Gordon.
2.2.6 Firm-Based Regulation for Ethical Infrastructure
Finally, consumerist-competitive regimes are distinguished by the fact that, in addition to regulating
individual legal service providers, they also regulate the enterprises in which those people work. Where
professionalist-autonomy regimes trust in lawyers and assume that lawyers will collectively enforce good
behaviour, consumerist-competitive regimes do not. Accordingly, they are more likely to promulgate
regulations aimed at enhancing firms' ‘ethical infrastructure’ of ‘organisations, policies, and operating
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procedures’. 146 Much of the firm-based regulation in consumerist-competitive regimes is ‘indirect’—it
requires leaders within a firm to take responsibility for others.147 However England/Wales and Australia
have begun to adopt direct firm regulation, which looks beyond the behaviour of individuals and attends
to the firm itself. Examples include the obligation to establish a procedure for responding to client
complaints, 148 and Queensland's Workplace Culture Check questionnaire and dialogue process. 149
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2.3 Adding Complexity to the Taxonomy: Multiple Strategies, Hybrid Categories, and Unintended
Consequences
In Parts 2.1 and 2.2, we have described the professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive
frameworks. In practice, though, regulators rarely employ only one approach. In this section, we explain
how the taxonomy sheds light on the complexity of legal services regulation by highlighting the use of
multiple and hybrid frameworks, as well as the manifestation of unintended results.
2.3.1 Hybrid Strategies
The most common hybrid strategies are what we term professionalist-regulated approaches that combine
professionalist-independent assumptions regarding legal services with external or co-regulation found in
consumerist-competitive systems or professionalist-competitive approaches that combine professionalistindependent assumptions with the behavioural framework of the consumerist-competitive model.
One professionalist-regulated approach is the common law doctrine of malpractice, which regulates
lawyers through tort and contract doctrines of general application, reflecting a consumerist-competitive
strategy. But to the extent that malpractice law relies on the expert testimony of lawyers to define
lawyers’ duties it employs a professionalist-independent strategy.
Another common professionalist-regulated strategy is gatekeeping rules which seek to protect third
parties and the public by requiring lawyers to take steps contrary to the instructions, and possibly the
interests, of the corporation, 150 such as the Sarbanes-Oxley lawyer regulations 151 and IRS Circular 230. 152
These gatekeeping rules are consumerist-competitive in that they seek to remedy market failures through
external regulation of lawyers. They are professionalist-independent in that, as Sung Hui Kim explains,
they rely on “’lawyer-exceptionalism’ – the notion that lawyers’ societal function is unique and
qualitatively different from that of other professionals who have legal obligations to avert fraud.” 153 In
contrast to these professionalist-regulated approaches, other gatekeeping provisions are wholly
professionalist-independent, such as Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules. 154 It would also be possible to
develop gatekeeping rules wholly within a consumerist-competitive framework, based upon a rationale
that equates lawyers with fiduciaries generally or that imposes duties because of the tasks lawyers
perform providing them with access to specific information and an opportunity to prevent wrongdoing, as
opposed to lawyer exceptionalism.
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A gatekeeping provision that presents a closer question of classification is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 11 applies to lawyers and to clients as would a consumerist-competitive provision,
although the Rule imposes greater duties on lawyers, as would a professionalist-independent provision.
Promulgated by courts, as are lawyer regulations under the professionalist-independent mode, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are developed outside of the lawyer regulation framework and require approval
by Congress. Because it is court regulation that posits a special role for lawyers, we suggest placing Rule
11 within the professionalist-independent framework and not the professionalist-regulated category.
An additional example of a professionalist-regulated approach is California’s regulation of lawyers.
California is the only United States jurisdiction where the legislature, an external regulator, primarily
promulgates rules of lawyer conduct. Yet these rules track professionalist-independent assumptions
regarding the essentialism of legal services, including the prohibition of multidisciplinary practice. 155
Another hybrid framework is professionalist-competitive. In the State of Washington and the Provinces
of British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario, for example, there are small notarial and paralegal professions
which provide legal services in competition with lawyers. 156 Similarly, in New York, British Columbia,
and Nova Scotia, regulations contemplate imposing responsibilities on law firms, 157 contrary to the
professionalist-independent reliance on the accountability of lawyers as individuals.
2.3.2 Multiple Strategies
Where hybrid strategies combine professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive elements,
multiple strategies refer to employment of both professionalist-independent and consumerist-competitive
strategies in the same jurisdiction. Indeed, no common-law jurisdiction employs only one regulatory
strategy.
In common law North America, laws of general application that apply to lawyers, such as fraud or
criminal provisions, represent a consumerist-competitive approach even within jurisdictions that generally
regulate lawyers through professionalist-independent mechanisms. Similarly, England and Wales retain
self-regulated entities reflecting a professionalist-independent approach as front-line regulators 158 that are
subservient to state-accountable and layperson-dominated bodies.
2.3.3 Unintended Consequences
Professionalist-independent or consumerist-competitive approaches may sometimes cause very different
results than what regulators intend. For example, professionalist-independent regulators in the United
States reject the possibility of nonlawyers delivering legal services and therefore refuse to encourage
regulation of nonlawyer legal service providers. As a result, an increasing number of legal services
businesses are developing outside of the regulatory regime at both ends of the market, such as Axiom
(project-based legal work) or Clearspire (virtual law practice) as alternatives to the traditional corporate
155
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law firm and LegalZoom (online legal forms) or Modria (online dispute resolution) as options for the
consumer law market. 159
Conclusion
We began this project by seeking to gain insight into why common law jurisdictions have adopted
divergent regulatory strategies. By placing strategies for regulating legal services in the context of
rationales for regulation more generally, we identified assumptions regarding the purposes and methods
of regulations that we classify generally into professionalist-independent frameworks dominant in the
United States and Canada, and consumerist-competitive frameworks dominant in Australia, England and
Wales. These frameworks, in turn, construct particular occupational structures, governance regimes, and
substantive rules, including limitations on the role of non-licensee service providers. The taxonomy of
dominant frameworks also helps identify exceptions to these frameworks, whether they represent hybrid
or alternate strategies, or unintended consequences.
A comprehensive normative evaluation of these alternative modes of regulation is beyond the scope of
this Essay. Competitive-consumerist regulators take the consumer interests of clients more seriously, and
this approach may produce more accessible and better-quality legal services for individual clients.
However, others might argue that these regulators have abandoned ancient and worthy ambitions, such as
instilling altruistic service orientation in lawyers and maintaining a profession independent of state and
market. Even among the co-authors of this piece there is disagreement over the preferred regulatory
regime. For example, one of us has advocated elsewhere that the American public would benefit from
increased competitive-consumerist regulation through liberalisation of the nonlawyer ownership and
investment bans in the United States. 160 Another argues more generally that a competitive-consumerist
approach best promotes the goals of individual rights and equal access to political and economic power.161
A third believes that sufficiently ambitious reform might bring professionalist-independent regulation into
the 21st century without jettisoning its core commitments.162 Regardless of our individual normative
views, there is benefit in crafting a descriptive categorisation of lawyer regulation as we have done here.
The intention of this taxonomy is to stimulate further inquiry into the assumptions underlying, and
characteristics of, comparative regulatory regimes, as well as into which assumptions and characteristics
are appropriate for particular purposes. The taxonomy is designed to aid scholars and regulators alike as
they evaluate merits of existing regulation and consider proposals for reform.
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